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The Vincennes Incident:
Another Player on the Stage?*
N A N C Y C. R O B E R T S
Department of Systems Management, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 93943, USA
and
KRISTEN A N N D O T T E R W A Y
United States Air Force
On 3 July 1988 at 1024 local time, the Aegis cruiser, USS Vincennes (CG49), shot
down Iran Air Flight 655 with two standard missiles. The civilian airliner was on
a routine, international flight from Bandar Abbas, Iran, to Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, flying on a designated commercial airway. The missiles intercepted the
airliner at a range of eight nautical miles (NM) from the Vincennes at an altitude
of 13,500ft. All 290 passengers and crew were killed.1
It has been over five years since this tragedy, but the Vincennes incident remains
a contentious issue. Many questions have been raised and remain unanswered,
and perhaps never will be fully answered given the complex nature of the event
and the strong feelings it has evoked in all who were touched by its horrible
consequences. Despite the continuing controversy that surrounds the case, we
believe there is still the opportunity for learning. Thus we revisit the Vincennes
incident not in the spirit of recrimination or fault-finding, but in the hope that it
can teach us how to minimize the chances of a similar occurrence in the future.
We begin by summarizing the various inquiries, both official and unofficial, that
have centered on the Vincennes incident. Limited by space and unable to do justice
to all of the factors in this complex incident, we focus on one intriguing issue that
has plagued all who have reviewed the case - the flight pattern of the Iranian
airbus. Was it ascending or descending toward the Vincennes? We examine one
possible explanation for the confusion over the flight path - the transposition of
computer-assigned track numbers between Flight 655 and another aircraft in the
operating area. Using the unclassified data from the formal investigation and
report conducted by Rear Admiral Fogarty, we explore the extent to which the
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transposition of the track numbers could have been a factor in the downing of
the Airbus. We conclude with some of the lessons to be learned in undertaking
this exercise and recommendations for follow-on action.
VINCENNES INQUIRIES
The first investigation of the shootdown of Flight 655, directed by order of General
George B. Crist, USMC, Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command, was
conducted by Rear Admiral William M. Fogarty, USN, Director, JCS Policy and
Plans (J-5) with a team of seven officers. A board of inquiry, convened in Bahrain
by Rear Admiral Fogarty, sat from 13-19 July 1988. Drawing on all data collected
from the interviews, testimony, on-site visits and analysis completed by experts
at the Naval Sea Systems Command and at the Naval Surface Warfare Center at
Dahlgren, Rear Admiral Fogarty issued his formal report on the findings to
General Crist on 28 July 1988.
Additional inquiries and hearings followed this formal report. Under the direc-
tion of the Chief of Naval Operations, the senior investigating officer requested
a USN medical corps team evaluation to determine if the dynamics on board ship
were such that they impacted the crew's ability to perceive and relay data. The
team, composed of psychiatrists and psychologists and led by Commander John
Matecvun, were originally scheduled to spend up to 30 days, but in fact departed
on 7 August 1988 after a three-day evaluation of the captain and the crew. The
evaluation team sent a classified message off the ship detailing the crew's
psychological health.2
On 8 September 1988, the Committee on Armed Services of the US Senate,
chaired by Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), heard testimony from witnesses,
including Rear Admiral Fogarty and Rear Admiral Robert J. Kelly, USN, Vice
Director for Operations, Joint Staff.3 Additionally, the Defense Policy Panel of
the House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Congressman Les Aspin
(D-Wisconsin), called witnesses on 6 October 1988 to present testimony on the
psychological factors that contributed to the downing of the Airbus. Five panelists
representing the American Psychological Association (APA) gave testimony.4
Captain Will Rogers published his own exploration of the shootdown of Flight
655 in his book Storm Center in 1992.5 His personal account as Commanding
Officer of the USS Vincennes during the downing of the Airbus expanded and
elaborated on the formal record presented in 1988. In addition, a Master's Thesis
by Captain Kristen Ann Dotterway (USAF), completed at the Naval Postgraduate
School, relied on his co-operation to explore some of the unanswered questions
arising from the 1988 formal report.6
Another inquiry of the Vincennes incident was spearheaded by Newsweek
correspondent John Barry and retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel Roger Charles
in collaboration with "Nightline", an ABC sponsored program. Their report, enti-
tled "Sea of Lies"7 and detailed in a Newsweek article on 13 July 19928 provided
an alternative perspective on the shootdown and its causes. And finally, Lieutenant
Colonel David Evans (US Marine Corps Retd), published his evaluation of the
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Vincennes incident in a "case study" published in the US Naval Institute
Proceedings, in August 1993.9 Building on information from Captain David
Carlson, then commander of the frigate USS Sides,™ this also questioned the
government's and Captain Rogers's explanations on the downing of the Airbus.
DESCENT OR ASCENT OF FLIGHT OF 655?
Discrepancies about the events surrounding the Vincennes incident range from
the major to the minor. Of particular significance is the trajectory of Flight 655.
While the Aegis data tapes revealed a flight pattern of ascent from a take-off in
Bandar Abbas,11 crewmen in the Vincennes's Combat and Information Center
(CIC) recollected a pattern of descent toward the Vincennes, a pattern more char-
acteristic of an attack profile. While it is acknowledged that this discrepancy was
not the sole causal factor in the shootdown in both the Fogarty Report and Captain
Rogers's book Storm Center, it raises some important questions about the CIC
operators' ability to perceive and interpret data and the commanding officer's
ability to make informed decisions from those data. This is an especially impor-
tant issue under periods of "time compression" when decisions have to be made,
as in this case, in a very short period of time - three minutes and 40 seconds to
be exact.
Unable to account for the discrepancy between system data and the crew's
recollections of the Airbus's flight pattern, Admiral C.A.H. Trost, Chief of Naval
Operations, directed a team of medical experts to conduct an evaluation of the
crew. Crediting their conclusions, the Fogarty report states that "stress, task
fixation, and an unconscious distortion of data may have played a major role in
this incident".12 Continuing, the report states that "in an unconscious attempt to
make available evidence fit a preconceived scenario, (considered by psychologists
to be "scenario fulfillment"), the tactical information co-ordinator (TIC) appears
to have distorted data flow".13
When the team arrived on board his ship, Captain Rogers asked them "how
five people at five separate consoles could have seen something that hard data
did not support?" He quotes their response in Storm Center p. 161:
The question of perceptual distortion or misinterpretation of data in relation to
combat stress was examined. It is well known that an expectant mind-set can lead
to misinterpretation of data. . . . Chances of occurrence can be related to combat
stress and perceived threat, but other factors such as experience, uniqueness
of data, lack of confidence, in equipment or leadership and length of time
to evaluate data must be considered pertinent. That five or more combatants,
some with prior combat experience, most with extensive equipment experience,
all viewing separate displays for cognitively separate periods of time would have
the same perceptual distortion or misinterpretation of data is highly implausible.
Having verified in a personal communication with Commander Matecvun14 the
accuracy of the Rogers's account, we are left with another puzzle. If "perceptual
distortion or misinterpretation of data is highly implausible", what then can
account for the discrepancy between the system data and the crew's recollections?
Again, we turn to Captain Rogers's commentary for some clues.
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On 10 July 1988, Senior Chief Tim Cox, Chief Mike Adams and a team of
computer technicians from the Vincennes conducted their own informal analysis
of the system print-outs. They knew, for identification purposes, every unit working
in the link was assigned a participating unit (PU) number so that each input from
that ship or aircraft could be identified. They discovered that the Vincennes's orig-
inal track number 4474 for the Iranian Airbus shifted to 4131 - a track number
that came from the USS Sides. The shift was not an uncommon occurrence. It
was an automatic feature, allowing Aegis to "conserve" assigned track numbers.
Due to the Aegis system's enormous targeting capability, another unit's track
number would be automatically adopted if the system made a track correlation
with its "own ship" information.
In examining the system data, they identified a peculiar trend: when track number
4474 was dropped, it did not remain in storage as an unused track number but kept
reappearing throughout the air engagement.15 Chief Cox reported this perplexing
data to Rogers:
The weird thing we can't figure is that 4474 was deleted as an active number
and taken back by us, but it didn't go away, it keeps reappearing over and over
and dropping in and out. We can't tell for sure because we don't have everything
we need, but it looks like another PU was in the link using our track number
assignment.16
Captain Rogers immediately approved Chief Cox's request to work with the
analysts from NSWC Dahlgren to research the source of this "anomaly". After
co-ordinating with the analysts, led by Mr. Reuben Pitts, Chief Cox reported the
findings to both Captain Rogers and his legal counsel, Captain Dennis McCoy,
USN:
Okay, let's start simple. As you know, each PU is assigned a block of numbers
for its use. Once this authorized track block is entered into the unit's combat
system, contacts reported by the unit are automatically assigned track numbers
from that block.
Okay, on 3 July we were assigned the block 4400 to 4576, and we were link
manager. The Sides was assigned 3400 to 3576 but for some reason was reporting
contacts using 4100 series numbers . . . Anyway the USS Spruance was operating
about 180 miles south-east of us in the Arabian Sea and reported a contact using
TN 4474, the same number we originally assigned to the Airbus. They pegged this
to a low flying A-6 from the Forrestal and apparently they didn't update and let
it coast . . .
Now, get this: HMS Manchester, which was entering the southern link with us,
picked up the Spruance contact, updated it, and reported it over the link. They
entered this track at almost the same time the Airbus was about twenty miles
from us.17
Captain Rogers reflected on Chief Cox's remarks and recalled the following
sequence of events at the 20NM critical decision point in which the Vincennes
was entering into the air-to-surface weapon's envelope:
I recalled that when the unidentified aircraft was at about that range, I had asked,
"What is 4474 doing?" I was unaware at that moment that the Sides's TN 4131
had been adopted automatically by the system (to identify the Airbus) and
4474 retrieved by the Vincennes. The answer I'd received over the interns
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communications net was "descending altitude, speed 450 knots". We now appar-
ently know that the information referred not to the Airbus but to the A-6
Intruder.18
We found no reference in the Fogarty Report concerning the possibility of a
track number transposition between two aircraft. Instead, Admiral Fogarty's later
testimony at the Senate hearing reaffirmed what he still considered to be a puzzling
aspect of the incident - the "misreading of altitude". He stated his investigation
team was "unsuccessful in satisfactorily reconciling the conclusion that the contact
was descending when in fact the Aegis weapon system showed the aircraft always
to be climbing".19 However, he did believe that "with little time and under combat
stress during a surface engagement, watchstanders misinterpreted some tactical
information".20
Picking up on the theme of combat stress and scenario fulfillment, five
psychologists on behalf of the American Psychological Association testified before
Congress on the Vincennes incident. Based on their reading of the Fogarty Report
and its subsequent endorsements by General Crist, Admiral William J. Crowe,
Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary
of Defense, and without benefit of personal dialogue with the crew, also concluded
that there were "predictable failings of human judgement under intense stress
compounded by complex technology [which] clearly contributed to the accidental
shooting of Iranian airliner Flight 655".21 Their testimony and the growing
congressional interest and scrutiny surrounding the issue prompted the Office of
Naval Research to launch a major research initiative called Tactical Decision-
Making Under Stress (TADMUS) in order to learn how to avoid similar occur-
rences in the future.
Given the widespread belief that combat stress was responsible for the crew's
"misreading of altitude", there has been little effort to explore alternative expla-
nations. In fact, Captain Rogers's "discourse" on track number 4474 is considered
"mysterious" by some.22 Yet Captain Rogers continues to maintain that a second
aircraft existed and that its track number was transposed with that of the Iranian
Airbus. Specifically, he attributes the transposition of the numbers not to the Aegis
system nor the console operators, but to the Navy's Tactical Data System Link
11 network and the way shipboard systems assign track numbers to a contact.23
We are not in a position to judge the efficacy of the Tactical Data System Link
11 network nor do we have access to the geographic track files of the vessels and
air contacts involved. Instead, we seek to test Captain Rogers's explanation of the
discrepancy between the system data and the crew's recollections of the events
by matching it against the data available in the Fogarty Report. Is there evidence
to support Captain Rogers's contention?
ANALYSIS
The first step in our analysis was to create a "data base" from the Fogarty Report.
It consists of two kinds of data: the system data derived from the system tapes
and the recollected data drawn from interviews with the crew after the incident.
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Table 1 summarizes the system data in the Fogarty Report extracted from the
data tapes of the Aegis Command and Decision (C&D) system. The data are
presented in the form of range, altitude, time, speed and track number variables.
For example, at a range of 44 NM, an aircraft, assigned the track number
4474, was flying at an altitude of 2500ft at a speed of 232 knots at 10:18am, local
time
The recollected data, from witnesses' statements and testimony, are summarized
in Table 2. Since no internal voice recordings are available, these data, of necessity,
rely on individuals' perceptions and recall. For example, the AIC-3 remembered a
plane, track number 4131, flying at a range of 30 NM, at an altitude of 9,000ft, at
10:21am. Thus, the information in Tables 1 and 2 are a tabular composite of data
entries extracted from the text in the air engagement "Time Line" section of the
Fogarty Report.24
Combining the data in Tables 1 and 2, we see in Table 3 the variance between
the system data and the recollected data. Some recollected data entries are
reasonably close to actual data entries - within 2,000ft in altitude and within three
nautical miles. These are marked with a "0". Others, marked with a "[• ]" , show
greater divergence from actual data entries - in excess of 2,000ft and three and
nautical miles. Thus, the first entry for AIC-3 is coded as "0", indicating a disparity
of only 2,000 feet in altitude and a disparity of only one nautical mile between
the system data and the AIC-3's recollections. On the other hand, the third
AIC-3 entry, indicated "[• ]" , reveals a disparity of 3,300 feet in altitude between
the system data and the recollected data.
Table 1















































































Altitude obtained from Senate Hearing, 1988, p. 10.
Aegis auto-correlated the Vincennes' track number of 4474 and the Sides' track number of 4131,
resulting in TN 4131 as the new track number for the air contact originating from Bandar Abbas.
FC-1 hooked TN 4474.
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Table 2





























































































Several witness accounts were provided in the form of ranges. These ranges were averaged to
obtain a single value in order to plot the data point.
"At engagement" estimated by the authors to mean 8NM.
Table 3

























































































































Data entries that appeared incompatible with both recollected and system data
Recollected data entries that were reasonably close to system data entries - within 3 NM and
2000 feet
Highly disparate entries from system data entries - in excess of 3 NM and 2000 feet
System data entries from Aegis data tapes
Recollected data entries by witnesses
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Figure 1 System & Recollected Data Combined - Altitude vs. Range
In order to compare visually the relationships between the system data and the
recollected data, we created scatter plots in Figures 1-4. Figure 1 combines both
system and recollected data and plots altitude against range. Figure 2 combines
system and recollected data and plots altitude against time. Figure 3 shows the
recollected data points and plots altitude against range, and Figure 4 combines
both system and recollected data and plots speed against time.
We see in Figures 1 and 2 some interesting patterns. First, when plotted against
range and time, the system data (indicated by a "star") show Flight 655 to be
continuously climbing in altitude, revealing a strong linear relationship among the
system data points. We also see that the system data point representing the
FC-l's hook of TN4474 (indicated by an "X" in a box and best seen in Figure 1)
is not part of this linear relationship. In fact, as an outlier among the system data
points, separated by a minimum of 60 NM, it suggests the existence of a second
aircraft. Yet its track number - 4474 - is the same track number that was origi-
nally assigned by the Vincennes to Flight 655 when it took off from Bandar Abbas.
Examining the recollected data in Figure 1, we see a weak clustering tendency.
Some of the recollected data points (those indicated by "0") cluster around the
"line" of the system data. Other recollected data points (indicated by a "[0]")
cluster together in the lower left-hand quadrant of the graph. Thus, while some
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Figure 2 System & Recollected Data Combined - Altitude vs. Time
data points suggest the contact is increasing in altitude, others suggest that it is
decreasing in altitude. This clustering pattern is also consistent with the existence
of two aircraft.
To investigate further the clustering pattern of the recollected data, we plotted
the recollected data by individual witnesses in Figure 3. In a magnification of
the box drawn in Figure 1, Figure 3 labels the recollected data points by each
witness who provided the particular kinematic data point. Thus, we see that six
CIC watchstanders matched the system data entries compatible with a climbing
profile: A1C-3, AAWC, OSDA, CSC, IAD, and TIC. Conversely, eight CIC
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AAWC Anti-Air Warfare Co-ordinator MSS
ADT Automatic Detection and Tracking NTDS
AIC Air Intercept Controller OSDA
CIC Combat Information Center PU
CSC Combat System Controller RSC
FC Force Co-ordinator SUCAP
IAD International Air Distress TIC
IDS Identification Supervisor TN
Missile System Supervisor
Naval Tactical Data System
Own Ship Display System
Participating Unit
Radar System Controller
Surface Combat Air Patrol
Tactical Information Co-ordinator
Track Number
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Figure 3 Recollected Data by Witnesses - Altitude vs. Range Scatter Plot
watchstander data entries progressively diverged from the system data and saw a
profile compatible with descent: IAD, AIC-3, AAWC, RSC, MSS, UBS, 49ADT,
and IDS. Of these witnesses, five of the eight crew members had double or triple
recollected data entries. As shown by the broken lines in Figure 3, these crew
members observed decreases in altitude from their previous observations made a
minute or two earlier. Even the TIC, whose observation matched exactly with the
system data at 11,000ft, saw a 1,000ft decrease in altitude a minute later, while
the 49 ADT saw a 4,200ft drop in altitude between observations. These data points
suggest the importance of time in the sequence of events. With the exception of
GW's recollection, the recollected data are compatible with the systems data
before 1022L. And most importantly, the recollected data consistently diverge
after 10:22am. The pattern suggests that the watchstanders were tracking one
aircraft before 10:22am and a different aircraft after 10:22am.
Figure 3 yields other provocative data concerning the time period of 10:22am:
• FC-1 hooked TN 4474 for five seconds at a range of 110 NM, bearing of 139
degrees, altitude of 11, 900 feet, and speed of 448 knots.25
• 49 ADT recalled a contact with an altitude of 12,000ft, 3,600 higher than the
system data as shown in Figure 3;
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Figure 4 System & Recollected Data Combined - Speed vs. Time
• Captain Rogers asked at 20 NM, "What is 4474 doing?"26 (He was unaware
that the track number of Flight 655 had been changed to 4131). Over the
communication net came the reply: "TN 4474 descending, speed 450 knots."27
• The UK Type 42 destroyer HMS Manchester, entered into the southern
Persian Gulf link at or slightly before 10:22am and brought with it the kine-
matics for a A-6 Intruder on a surface air combat patrol (SUCAP) mission
in the Gulf of Oman. The A-6 was assigned a track number of 4474 by the
Spruance.28
These events illustrate the convergence among independent data points in terms
of time, altitude, speed and track number. It is very likely that TN 4474, identified
by FC-1 (system data) at 10:22am, flying at an altitude of 11,900 feet, at a speed
of 448 knots and at a range of 110 NM, was the same plane that the communication
net recollected identifying as TN 4474 flying at 450 knots and descending. And it
is equally likely that 49 ADT, the first of the highly disparate recollected data
entries, picked up the same aircraft, which he remembered as flying at 12,000ft.
From that point on, the recollected data are consistent with a descent profile, as
we see in Figures 1 and 3. Again, the pattern is consistent with the existence of
two planes.
42 Nancy C. Roberts and Kristen Ann Dotterway
We see the same pattern when we plot speed against time in Figure 4. There
is a linear relationship of the system data for Flight 655, indicated by a "star",
with ranges in speed from 232 knots to 385. We also see four other data points
that are not consistent with this linear relationship: the FC-1 system data which
indicates a speed of 448 knots; the recollected data from the IAD and the IDS
which indicates speeds of 450 and 445 knots respectively, and Rogers's recollection
of a speed of 450 knots at the critical 20 NM launch envelope for air-to-surface
weapons. All four speed values are within a five-knot range of one another - a
very close relationship considering the diversity of the sources. And all four
register speeds well beyond the top speed recorded by Flight 655. Again, the
scatterplot suggests a pattern consistent with the existence of two planes rather
than one.
In summary, system data and recollected data drawn from the unclassified
version of the Fogarty Report, when plotted in terms of altitude, speed, range
and time, reveal profiles that are consistent with the existence of two aircraft.
What makes these data even more compelling is the system data evidence that
indicates that the track number (TN 4474) was assigned to two different aircraft
at two different points in time: first, to Flight 655, and then to a flight at a range
of 110 NM from the Vincennes. Thus, we do not find it inconsistent with the data
drawn from the Fogarty Report to suggest that there were two aircraft whose
identities were confused due to the transposition of track numbers.
CONCLUSION
This re-examination of the data from the Fogarty Report should be viewed with
the customary caution. First of all, there are many unanswered questions about
the Vincennes incident as the various hearings, reports and articles attest. Our
research addresses only one aspect of a very complex case, so it should not be
interpreted and applied beyond the limited confines to which it was directed -
the flight pattern of 655 and the possible transposition of track numbers between
two aircraft. Secondly, data do not necessarily "prove" anything; they merely lend
support or fail to lend support to a particular hypothesis or position. In this
case, the data and our analysis do support Captain Rogers's explanation of the
discrepancy between the system data and the recollected data. In fact, we find
them to be a relatively "good fit" with his explanation - that there were two
aircraft and their track numbers were transposed. However, since the Fogarty
Report provides a limited amount of the system and recollected data, we would
recommend full disclosure of the geographic track files of the vessels and the air
contacts of those involved to settle this matter once and for all.
There has been a very important "lesson learned" for us in conducting this
research, and we suspect for others who have been involved in event reconstructions
- especially military events of the Vincennes's magnitude. Event reconstruction is
an enormously difficult task and it needs special expertise to do it well. In the
Vincennes case, for example, hundreds of people had to be interviewed and hours
of system data analyzed, second by second. A very large data base with both
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qualitative and quantitative information had to be constructed and synthesized. In
addition, issues of foreign policy and national security, the history and context of
the region and the combatants, the rules of engagement, the military command
structure and its communication process, the training and experience of the crew,
and the readiness of the ship had to be considered. Also, in the case of sophisti-
cated weapons systems such as Aegis, which have been "battle tested" more in
training exercises than in combat, questions had to be asked of the complex tech-
nology's performance and the crew's skills in its employment. Thus, a staggering
amount of data had to be processed, requiring considerable time and expertise for
collection, analysis, synthesis and interpretation.
Time was of the essence. It was important to hold people accountable if
culpability was indicated, exonerate the innocent, and explain to the American
public and the international community what happened and why. Most impor-
tantly, if mistakes were made, corrective action had to be taken to reassure people
and nations that it would not happen again.
Yet, how much do we know about event reconstruction? And how good are we
at it? We know there is a trade-off between time devoted to an investigation and
the quality of its findings. The push for immediate answers can create distortions
and factual inaccuracies that not only cause confusion, but later can also fuel the
flames of conspiratorial theory, especially if later "facts" contradict earlier ones.
For example, the earliest reports had Flight 655 flying outside the commercial
corridor, descending, and picking up speed when it advanced toward the Vincennes.
In reality, always ascending, the Iranian airliner remained within the boundaries of
the commercial corridor and continued to fly in an ascending profile.
We also know that there can be significant difficulties with the data collection
process. In this instance, questions have been raised whether all key witnesses
were interviewed (eg., the commanders on board the Forrestal, and Captain
McKenna, the surface-warfare commander in Bahrain).29 Others have charged
that certain data, such as the information from the Navy journalists on board
the Vincennes during the incident, were not submitted to the formal board of
investigation.30
Some critics use these potential lapses in the data collection process as evidence
of a conspiracy or "cover up".31 An equally plausible explanation is that investi-
gators cannot immediately identify the "key people" in an event, nor do they
necessarily know how to ask the right questions, manage the enormous amount
of information collected, or follow potentially important leads. Data gathering,
analysis and management are far from automatic processes. They require not only
ingenuity but also specialized skills. Furthermore, once collected, data do not auto-
matically produce facts or even a reasonable interpretation of facts. Data must be
reviewed, analyzed and interpreted against a back-drop of competing hypotheses
and explanations. This likewise requires a special set of research skills. The real
question for us, and we suspect for others who have participated in accident inves-
tigations, is how well do we prepare our investigators to engage in such a research
effort? To what extent do officers have the skills and expertise to undertake this
type of research assignment, especially under time pressure and international
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scrutiny? Those expert at driving ships are not necessarily expert at data collection,
analysis and interpretation.
Lest some accuse us of blindness to potential conspiracy or cover-up, we have
only to remind them of the lapses in data collection and analysis that our brief
study revealed: no discussion of the track number problem in the Fogarty Report;
no consideration of a second plane; an inconsistency between what the medical
team found among the Vincennes crew and what was later summarized in the
Fogarty Report. Rather than consider these examples as evidence of a conspiracy
or cover-up, however, we believe a likely interpretation lies in the inability of the
investigators to interpret data that did not converge to form a coherent pattern.
Finding a discrepancy between system data and crew's recollections, and unable
to explain it, the investigators speculated that the problem had to be due to task
fixation, scenario fulfillment and combat-induced stress. Perhaps, given the
pressure of time, it was easier to find fault with the operators than to leave a
critical or embarrassing question unanswered or to challenge the efficacy of tactical
support systems such as NTDS (Link 11).
The real irony of the Vincennes case may be that the investigators themselves
set up a scenario that was eventually fulfilled by the five research psychologists.
During their congressional testimony, the psychologists asserted that, based on
their reading of the Fogarty Report, stress was indeed a factor in the downing of
the Iranian Airbus. Given this "finding", they advocated more research money be
allocated to study of combat decision-making under stress. Congress and ONR
obliged and authorized the program TADMUS. As the self-fulfilling "solution"
came full-circle, the studies spawned from this project then used the Vincennes
case to highlight "the question of how stress can affect decision-making".32
Speculation about "combat stress" seems to have become an established "fact"
during congressional testimony and a "well established fact" by the time ONR set
up the TADMUS program and had allocated millions of dollars to study tactical
decision-making under stress in order to attract researchers to solve "the problem".
In summary, at the risk of setting up another scenario for someone else to fulfill,
we recommend a policy debate on the merit of establishing permanent teams of
specially trained officers to assist investigators of these types of accidents. A
discussion of their preparation, education and necessary skills would be an impor-
tant part of the dialogue. Central to the discussion also should be how to prepare
people to tackle event reconstruction - whether certain models or approaches are
more useful than others. For example, the Vincennes investigators used a finely-
grained time line to organize their data. In her research on the Vincennes,
Dotterway33 not only used a time line, but also experimented with organizational
and cybernetic models to identify the "causal" factors in the shootdown, gaining
different insights from each model. If officers continue to operate in harm's way,
(and world events provide increasing evidence that they will have that opportunity),
then we will need to find ways to ensure that when a follow-on investigation is
required, it will be as professional as we expect, and demand, the officers' service
to the country to be.
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